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CORPORATE SPEECH &  
THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 
Thomas W. Joo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How might the role of money in electoral politics change if 
corporations had no First Amendment rights? In short, “not 
much.” Insofar as the Supreme Court has protected business 
corporations1 under the Constitution, that protection has never 
expressly relied on the notion that a corporation per se has 
constitutional rights. To the contrary, a central strategy of the 
Court’s corporate constitutional jurisprudence has been to avoid 
deciding whether corporations are the holders of constitutional 
rights. Critics of corporate constitutional jurisprudence must 
recognize that it is based not on the rights of the corporation but 
on the rights of others. Recognizing this fact reveals the real 
weakness of the Court’s reasoning: it depends on a 
mischaracterization of corporate governance as a participatory 
democracy. 
This Essay makes two main arguments. First, the 
jurisprudence extending constitutional protection to corporations 
focuses not on the rights of corporations themselves, but on the 
rights of others. Criticizing the Court for focusing on corporate 
constitutional “personhood” misses the point of the case law. In 
fact, the jurisprudence has avoided simplistically equating the 
corporate legal “person” with the human individual to whom the 
 
 * Professor, UC Davis School of Law. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the “Advancing a New Jurisprudence for American Self-Government and 
Democracy” symposium in November 2014. The author would like to thank Free Speech 
for People and Harvard Law School for sponsoring the symposium, Ron Fein and John 
Coates for organizing it, and Jill Hasday and Tamara Piety for helpful discussion and 
comments on this paper. 
 1. This Essay focuses on for-profit business corporations. The constitutional case 
law, however, tends to conflate business and nonprofit corporations. Citizens United v. 
FEC, for example, involved a nonprofit corporation, but the opinion refers simply to 
“corporations.” The opinion is clearly intended to apply to business corporations, since it 
discusses the interests of shareholders, which nonprofits do not have. See 558 U.S. 310, 362 
(2010). 
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Constitution guarantees rights. The Court has done so by 
carefully reframing corporate constitutional law issues to focus on 
the interests of individuals. The Court has done this in two ways: 
First, it sometimes treats a corporation as an “aggregate” of 
individual natural persons. Second, in the free speech context, it 
focuses on the rights of human listeners rather than those of 
corporate speakers. For example, the Court has justified 
corporate speech protection on the basis of individuals' interest in 
hearing diverse viewpoints. 
My second point focuses on the real weakness of the 
corporate constitutional jurisprudence: its reliance on the 
common misconception that the actions of a corporation reliably 
reflect the will of its constituent individuals. Using this flawed 
assumption, the Supreme Court has held that corporate 
regulations infringe on the due process and Fourth Amendment 
rights of natural persons. The Court has made a related error in 
the free speech context—the central concern of this Essay. 
Although listeners may have an interest in hearing corporate 
messages, that may conflict with the interests of the corporation’s 
shareholders (or its other constituents, such as employees) if they 
disagree with those messages. But the Court has dismissed this 
concern on the ground that shareholders control a corporation’s 
messages through “the procedures of corporate democracy.”2 
However, corporate law does not, and is not intended to, run 
corporations in a democratic way. Rather, in the interests of 
money-making efficiency, the law concentrates power in 
professional managers.3 They enjoy nearly unreviewable 
discretion to control the resources of the corporation with 
negligible input from shareholders. As intended, this arrangement 
is likely to benefit shareholders financially. But it does not protect 
them (or other corporate constituents) from corporate political 
spending or other speech acts they disagree with. This fact 
undermines the Court’s listeners’ rights argument against 
corporate campaign finance regulation. It is also consistent with 
the proposed “Democracy for All Amendment,” which would 
 
 2. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.765, 794 (1978); Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 362. 
 3. See Thomas W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance, 79 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 1, 78 (2001) (“[C]orporate governance can be centralized and efficient, or it can 
be participatory and expressive, but it cannot be both.”). 
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expressly permit campaign finance law to regulate corporations 
and natural persons differently.4 
Another proposed constitutional amendment, the “People’s 
Rights Amendment,” would amend the Constitution to exclude 
corporations from the categories of “people, person, or citizen as 
used in this Constitution.”5 The amendment aims to deny 
corporations the rights the Constitution gives to human 
individuals. Because corporate First Amendment law does not 
depend on corporate rights per se, however, the People’s Rights 
Amendment would have no immediate determinative effect on 
corporate campaign finance regulation or other corporate speech 
laws. (It could nonetheless be useful in informing the Court of the 
public’s impatience with corporate constitutional protection, 
whatever its doctrinal basis.) 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part II 
describes the two ways in which the Supreme Court bases its 
corporate constitutional law jurisprudence on the rights of others: 
the aggregate theory and the listeners’ rights doctrine. Part III 
explains how these theories depend on the misperception that 
corporate decisions are made through “procedures of corporate 
democracy.” The Court does not indulge in a nonsensical 
equation of corporations with human beings. The real failing of 
the jurisprudence is its mischaracterization of corporate law and 
governance. Corporate constitutional doctrine is thus based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding about how corporations work. 
II. THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS 
Constitutional doctrine avoids the question of whether 
corporations are constitutional “persons” and focuses instead on 
the rights of others in two ways. First, the Court sometimes treats 
a corporation as no more, and no less, than an “aggregate” of 
human individuals.6 The Court then focuses on the rights of those 
individuals. In the First Amendment free speech context, the 
 
 4. See S.J. Res. 19 & H.J. Res. 119, 113th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2014). The proposed 
amendment would authorize “reasonable limits on the raising and spending of money by 
candidates and others to influence elections” and permit Congress and the states to 
“distinguish between natural persons and corporations or other artificial entities created 
by law, including by prohibiting such entities from spending money to influence elections.” 
 5. See S.J. Res. 18 & H.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). Free Speech for 
People, a co-sponsor of this Symposium, supports both amendments. See FREE SPEECH 
FOR PEOPLE, www.freespeechforpeople.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2015). I should disclose 
that I am a member of Free Speech for People’s Legal Advisory Committee. 
 6. See, e.g., David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 213–14 
(1990). 
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Court allows corporations to invoke individuals’ rights in a second 
way. The so-called “listeners’ rights” theory of the First 
Amendment protects the public’s right to hear messages, and thus 
requires neither a corporate nor an individual “right” to speak. 
The troublesome “corporate” aspects of the cases are thus 
made to disappear, and the Court employs existing notions of 
natural persons’ constitutional rights. While avoiding the fallacy 
of anthropomorphizing the corporation, this reductionist 
approach has fallacies of its own, because it depends on 
misunderstandings about the law and practice of corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is designed to optimize 
business performance by concentrating power in the hands of 
professional management. This is inconsistent with the aggregate 
theory’s notion that a corporation’s acts reflect the consensus of 
its members. It is also in tension with the listeners’ rights theory. 
Even if listeners have an interest in hearing political messages, it 
may be inappropriate for management to unilaterally decide to 
pay for such messages with corporate funds. 
It may be argued that it is excessively formalistic to 
distinguish between constitutional protection based on corporate 
“personhood” and protection derived from rights of others.7 
Whatever lawyerly rhetoric is deployed, corporations are in effect 
protected like individuals. While there is truth to this description 
of the end result, it is dangerous to be dismissive of the Court’s 
method of reaching that result. Advocating for reform requires an 
understanding of what is really at stake, but also the ability to 
challenge legal arguments on their own terms. These specific 
formal and rhetorical strategies are particularly well-suited to our 
neo-formalist and (nominally) libertarian era. The Court has 
carefully chosen to evade the (still-unanswered) question of 
corporate speech “rights” and reframe the issue in terms that are 
consistent with both existing constitutional law doctrine and 
various politically powerful notions: property rights, free markets, 
freedom of information, and limited government. 
 
 7. See, e.g., Jeff Clements, We never said corporations are people, CORPORATIONS 
ARE NOT PEOPLE, Jan. 12, 2012, http://corporationsarenotpeople.com/2012/01/23/we-
never-said-corporations-are-people-we-said-they-are-voices-speakers-speech-makers-a-
class-of-persons-thats-different/ (“No matter how the Court couches it, First Amendment 
rights or any other rights that are demanded and received by a corporate entity results in 
recognition – implicit, if nothing else – of a corporate Constitutional person.”); Melissa 
Block, What is the Basis for Corporate Personhood?, Nat’l Public Radio, Oct. 24, 2011, 
http://www.npr.org/2011/10/24/141663195/what-is-the-basis-for-corporate-personhood 
(“[T]he Occupy Wall Street protesters have distorted the details, but they really have it 
right in spirit.”). 
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A. CORPORATION AS AGGREGATE 
In some contexts, the Court has treated corporations’ 
constitutional claims as vindicating the rights of its constituent 
individuals. The Court first expressed this view in late nineteenth-
century cases invalidating state regulations for infringing on 
property rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process clause. In Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling 
Co. v. Pennsylvania, an 1888 case, the Court stated that “the 
designation of person” in the Fourteenth Amendment includes 
corporations because they are “merely associations of individuals 
united for a special purpose.”8 The Court did not hold that a 
corporation is itself a “person” in some metaphysical sense. 
Rather, the Court held that corporation is a group of individuals, 
and thus that its legal treatment affects the constitutional rights of 
individual persons. In a 1906 case, Hale v. Henkel,9 the Court 
invoked the aggregate theory to justify protecting a corporation’s 
papers from unreasonable searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees this right 
to “the people,” the Court did not state that corporations 
themselves are “people,” but again focused on the individuals 
behind the corporation: “A corporation is, after all, but an 
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a 
distinct legal entity.” 
More recently, in Hobby Lobby, the Court applied the 
aggregate theory to non-constitutional free exercise rights. Hobby 
Lobby and its co-petitioners were corporations that objected to 
the Affordable Care Act’s mandate that employers provide 
 
 8. 125 U.S. 181, 188 (U.S. 1888). There is a persistent myth that the Court granted 
corporations constitutional “personhood” two years earlier, in Santa Clara County. v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See, e.g., Dustin Volz, The Surprising 
and Complicated History of the ‘Corporations Are People’ Doctrine, NAT’L JOURNAL, July 
1, 2014, http://www.nationaljournal.com/domesticpolicy/the-surprising-and-complicated-
history-of-the-corporations-are-people-doctrine-20140701; Thomas Storck, Corporate 
Personhood and 14th Amendment Rights, CRISIS MAGAZINE, May 30, 2012, 
http://www.crisismagazine.com/2012/corporate-personhood-and-14th-amendment-rights. 
At oral argument in Santa Clara, Chief Justice Waite announced that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause applies to corporations. He did not state why, 
however, and did not state that corporations are “persons.” In any event, although this 
unusual statement appears in the headnotes of the case, see id. at 394, it was not part of the 
opinion, which was decided on state-law grounds and did not even address the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Furthermore, the lower court opinion, prefiguring Pembina, applied the 
Fourteenth Amendment using the aggregate theory. See Charles R. O’Kelley, The 
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited, 67 GEO. L. J. 1347, 1353–56 (1979). 
 9. 201 U.S. 43 (1906). 
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contraception coverage for their employees.10 Each corporation 
was entirely owned and controlled by the members of a single 
family whose members unanimously opposed the mandate on 
religious grounds.11 The case was based not on the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, but on the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). According to RFRA, the 
government may not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion” unless the burden furthers a compelling governmental 
interest by the least restrictive means available.12 The word 
“person” in a federal statute includes corporations “unless the 
context indicates otherwise.”13 In language reminiscent of 
Pembina and Hale, the Court insisted that protecting the 
petitioner corporations was necessary in order to protect 
individuals: 
Congress provided protection for people . . . by employing a 
familiar legal fiction: It included corporations within RFRA’s 
definition of “persons.” But it is important to keep in mind that 
the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human 
beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used by 
human beings to achieve desired ends . . . . [P]rotecting the free-
exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby . . . protects 
the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those 
companies. 
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause has not (yet) 
been applied to business corporations, but Hobby Lobby’s 
reasoning would seem to apply. The Clause forbids Congress from 
“prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. Hobby Lobby’s 
aggregate reasoning suggests that, at least in a small, privately 
owned corporation,14 corporate regulations can interfere with the 
religious exercise of its owner-managers. 
 
 10. The corporations specifically objected to the requirement that they cover 
contraceptives that act after conception. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 
2751, 2764 (2014). 
 11. Id. at 2764–65 (describing Conestoga Wood Specialties, owned by the Hahn 
family); see also id. at 2765–66 (describing Hobby Lobby and Mardel, owned by the Green 
family). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–1(a), (b) (emphasis added). 
 13. 1 U.S.C. § 1. 
 14. The Court limited its decision to “closely held” business corporations like the 
petitioners (that is, corporations owned by a small number of shareholders), and expressly 
declined to decide whether it would apply to a publicly traded corporation with large 
numbers of shareholders. 134 S.Ct. at 2774. 
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B. CORPORATIONS AND LISTENERS’ RIGHTS 
In corporate free speech cases under the First Amendment, 
the Court has invoked the rights of others in a different way. The 
aggregate theory suggests that corporate speech acts (including 
the political spending at issue in Citizens United) might be 
characterized as the protected speech of the corporation’s 
constituent individuals. The Court has not taken this approach, 
however. Instead, it has invoked the so-called “listeners’ rights” 
doctrine, under which a government regulation violates the Free 
Speech Clause if it interferes with the public’s interest in receiving 
messages.15 The Court originally developed that doctrine outside 
the corporate context to protect unpopular speech without having 
to defend the rights of unpopular speakers such as communists,16 
pornographers,17 and prison inmates.18 When the issue of 
corporate speech came before the Court, focusing on listeners’ 
rights allowed the Court to invalidate regulations on First 
Amendment grounds while once again avoiding the issue of 
“corporate rights.” Although the listeners’ rights theory focuses 
primarily on the audience and not the speaker, the Court’s 
application of the doctrine to corporate speech depends on an 
understanding of the corporation similar to that found in the 
aggregate theory, as will be explained below. 
The Court relied on listeners’ rights doctrine when it first 
protected corporate political spending in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti19 and invoked the same argument in Citizens 
United. In Bellotti, a Massachusetts state statute prohibited 
business corporations from spending money to influence a voter 
referendum unless it “materially affect[ed] the property, business, 
or assets of the corporation.”20 A group of corporations 
challenged the statute. In striking it down, the Court specifically 
stated that “we need not . . . address the abstract question whether 
corporations have the full measure of rights that individuals enjoy 
under the First Amendment.”21 Instead, the Court used the 
 
 15. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 576 
(1980) (“[A] strict standard of review applies . . . where the purpose of the restraint is to 
influence behavior by depriving citizens of information.”). Although commentators and 
lower courts refer to this doctrine as “listeners’ rights,” the Court itself does not. 
 16. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965). 
 17. See Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). 
 18. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408–09 (1974) (overruled in part on other 
grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–14 (1989)). 
 19. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 20. Id. at 774. 
 21. Id. at 777. 
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listeners’ rights doctrine: “the First Amendment goes beyond 
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to 
prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from 
which members of the public may draw.”22 
Although the decision focused on the interests of listeners, 
the analysis depended in part on the notion that a corporation’s 
shareholders control its speech, and was in this respect 
reminiscent of the aggregate theory. Even assuming that listeners 
have a right to hear the political messages of corporations, the 
state of Massachusetts argued that it had a countervailing interest 
in “preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of 
views with which some shareholders may disagree.”23 The Court 
rejected this justification on the ground that “shareholders 
normally are presumed competent to protect their own 
interests.”24 The Court went so far as to declaim, “Ultimately 
shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate 
democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on 
public issues.”25 The Court did not expressly state that corporate 
speech constitutes shareholder expression. Rather it seemed to 
make the related, but slightly more modest, claim that 
management decisions to fund political speech do not constitute 
unauthorized use of shareholder property. In any event, as with 
the aggregate theory, the listeners’ rights justification for 
protecting corporate speech assumes that shareholders control 
the corporation. 
In Citizens United, the Court again relied on listeners’ rights. 
It also cited Bellotti’s aggregate-based notion that shareholders 
control corporate speech. As in Bellotti, the Court did not directly 
address a corporation’s right to expression and focused instead on 
individuals’ interest in receiving information: “voters must be free 
to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine 
how to cast their votes.”26 Like Massachusetts in Bellotti, the 
federal government in Citizens argued that the corporate 
regulations in question served the government’s compelling 
interest in “protecting dissenting shareholders from being 
compelled to fund corporate political speech.”27 The Court, 
quoting Bellotti, dismissed this argument on the ground that there 
 
 22. Id. at 783. 
 23. Id. at 792–93. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010). 
 27. Id. at 362. 
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was “little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by 
shareholders ‘through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.’” 28 
Although the opinions sometimes use the terminology of 
rights,29 “listeners’ rights” decisions often turn on the public policy 
concern of information availability and not on individual “rights” 
in the technical sense. As Bellotti and Citizens United 
demonstrate, the plaintiff can be the speaker, and need not be an 
actual listener who can prove she has been harmed. Indeed, the 
doctrine does not require any such person to be identified at all: 
the listener and her harm can be mere hypothetical constructs. It 
has been argued that because listeners’ rights doctrine is based on 
instrumental policy interests rather than categorical individual 
rights, listeners’ rights arguments have less power than challenges 
based on expressive rights.30 As the state argued in Bellotti, the 
domination of political speech by corporate money may “drown 
out other points of view.”31 Both the speech and the regulation 
potentially serve the same interest: providing voters with a 
diversity of political views. Thus it has been argued that such 
regulations should be subject to “intermediate” or even “rational 
basis” review, and not to the strict scrutiny normally applied to 
speech regulation.32 The Court clearly rejected this distinction in 
Bellotti, however: the Court applied strict scrutiny based on 
information availability alone, having expressly stated that it was 
irrelevant whether the corporate plaintiff had expressive rights.33 
The danger of corporate voices “drowning out” others was 
insufficiently compelling to survive this scrutiny. Applying the 
same level of scrutiny in both the expressive and the listeners’ 
rights contexts is consistent with the wording of the Free Speech 
Clause (“Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech”), which mentions neither “persons” nor expressive rights. 
A few years after Bellotti, the Court seemed to reverse course 
and treat corporate speech differently from that of individuals. In 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, the Court held 
that a state’s corporate campaign finance regulation was 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[T]he Constitution protects 
the right to receive information and ideas.”). 
 30. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected 
Communications by Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 
1247 (1991). 
 31. 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1978) 
 32. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 30. 
 33. 435 U.S. at 786. 
CORPORATE SPEECH AND THE ROO_FINAL DRAFT II (DO NOT DELETE) 6/26/2015 2:32 PM 
344 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:335 
 
justifiably aimed at counteracting the “distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth.”34 The Court appeared to accept 
the “drowning out” argument it had rejected in Bellotti, although 
it did not purport to overrule Bellotti. Two decades later, 
however, Citizens United expressly overruled this aspect of Austin 
and reaffirmed Bellotti.35 
While it is convenient to describe the Free Speech Clause in 
terms of the rights or interests of speakers or listeners, it is 
arguably not based on individual interests at all. Many 
commentators argue that it should be seen as “negative rather 
than affirmative,”36 that is, as a restriction on government power 
rather than a conferral of individual rights.37 The Clause is of 
course phrased in just that way: as a prohibition on speech 
regulation by Congress.38 The Court implied the “negative” 
theory in Citizens United: “Premised on mistrust of governmental 
power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor 
certain subjects or viewpoints.”39 Soon afterwards, the Court 
offered further support for the “negative” theory of free speech. 
In 2012, United States v. Alvarez subjected a speech regulation to 
strict scrutiny even though the Court identified neither an 
expressive nor a listeners’ right. The Court struck down the Stolen 
Valor Act, a federal statute that imposed a criminal penalty on 
anyone falsely claiming to have received a U.S. military 
decoration.40 The Court did not assert that the petitioner 
prosecuted under the statute had a right to tell his “intended, 
undoubted lie,”41 nor that listeners have an interest in hearing 
such lies. 
Bellotti and Citizens United were premised on the notion that 
protecting political messages protects the voting public. But 
Alvarez went further, giving constitutional protection to false 
factual assertions that provide no public benefit. Indeed, the 
speech was concededly harmful, such that government had an 
interest in protecting the public from it. But that interest was 
insufficiently compelling, the Court found, because the public can 
 
 34. 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
 35. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). 
 36. See Kathleen Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
143, 156–57 (2010). 
 37. See id.; see also ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS 3 (2010). 
 38. Concurring in Citizens United, Justice Scalia noted that the Free Speech Clause 
is “written in terms of ‘speech,’ not speakers.” 558 U.S. at 392. 
 39. Id. at 340. 
 40. United States v Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012). 
 41. Id. at 2542. 
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supposedly protect itself from such harm without the 
government’s help. The law was unconstitutional not because it 
violated anyone’s rights, but simply because the Court found it 
unnecessary (despite the government’s assertion to the contrary). 
The Court quoted Justice Holmes’ famous dictum: “the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market,”42 and offered its own, more explicitly 
antigovernment version: “Only a weak society needs government 
protection or intervention before it pursues its resolve to preserve 
the truth.”43 
Cases like Bellotti make clear that either expressive or 
listeners’ rights can be sufficient to invalidate speech regulation. 
But Alvarez suggests that neither speakers’ nor listeners’ rights 
are necessary for this purpose: consistent with the “negative” 
theory, the Court simply applied an extremely strong 
presumption against any governmental regulation of 
communication. In any case, under either listeners’ rights or a 
negative theory, corporations’ free speech arguments are 
independent of constitutional “personhood” or speech “rights.” 
Thus excluding corporations from the category of “person,” as the 
People’s Rights Amendment proposes, would have no apparent 
effect on corporate free speech doctrine.44 
The listeners’ rights doctrine has allowed the Court to protect 
corporate political activity and other speech while avoiding the 
thorny question of whether corporations have the same 
expressive rights as individuals. The negative theory further 
supports these results and suggests the Court might go even 
further, invalidating almost all regulations on corporate 
communication and political spending on the ground that the 
“marketplace of ideas” is self-regulating. In challenging the 
constitutional protection of corporate political spending, it seems 
unrealistic to expect reform of fundamental First Amendment 
notions such as listeners’ rights and the negative theory. The 
jurisprudence can be challenged on narrower grounds, however, 
by focusing on its erroneous view of corporate law. 
 
 42. Id. at 2550 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
 43. Id. at 2550–51. 
 44. Furthermore, the aggregate theory notwithstanding, the People’s Rights 
Amendment might be used to deny Due Process protection to corporations, which could 
have drastic consequences for property rights. 
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III. THE MYTH OF “CORPORATE DEMOCRACY” 
A. THE CENTRALIZATION OF CORPORATE AUTHORITY 
In both Bellotti and Citizens United, the government warned 
of a danger that management may use corporate resources to fund 
speech that conflicts with shareholders’ views. Thus, the 
government may have a compelling interest in regulating 
corporate speech in order to protect shareholder property.45 The 
Court rejected this argument on the ground that shareholders 
protect themselves from such harm through “the procedures of 
corporate democracy.”46 Like the aggregate theory, this argument 
is based on the idea that the acts of a corporation reflect the 
shared will of its constituent individuals. This notion is mistaken, 
however. Corporate governance is not, and is not intended to be, 
a participatory democracy that reflects the ideas and values of a 
corporation’s constituents. Rather, it purposefully restricts the 
governance roles of shareholders and other constituents in favor 
of professional managers who are charged with making money for 
the corporation. Thus, Bellotti and Citizens United were wrong to 
casually assume that shareholders run the corporation. In fact, 
corporate governance has no mechanisms to insure that corporate 
speech that serves the rights of others (that is, listeners) does not 
infringe upon the rights of still others—namely shareholders or 
other corporate constituents who may disagree when 
management uses corporate resources for political purposes. 
Shareholders do not participate directly in decisionmaking, nor 
do shareholders have significant input into the selection of 
managers. Their primary recourse when they disagree with 
management is simply to sell their shares and move on.47 
In his Citizens United dissent, Justice Stevens specifically 
questioned the Court’s faith in “corporate democracy”: 
I fail to understand why the Court is so confident in these 
mechanisms . . . . In practice . . . many corporate lawyers will 
tell you that [shareholders’ rights to vote and to sue directors 
for breach of fiduciary duty] are so limited as to be almost 
nonexistent, given the internal authority wielded by boards and 
 
 45. This Essay takes no normative stance with respect to the listeners’ rights doctrine. 
As a descriptive matter, however, it is a fundamental aspect of free speech jurisprudence. 
As a strategic matter of legal reform, I see less potential in questioning that theory than in 
pointing out demonstrable errors in the Court’s reading of corporate law and governance. 
 46. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978); Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010). 
 47. See Joo, supra note 3, at 44–45, 57–58. 
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managers and the expansive protections afforded by the 
business judgment rule.48 
Justice Stevens correctly characterized corporate governance 
as management-centered rather than shareholder-directed. The 
“internal authority wielded by boards and managers” is a 
fundamental characteristic of corporate governance. Corporate 
law, by design, does not empower shareholders. Rather, it 
consciously grants control to professional management.49 
Delaware’s corporate code, for example, states that: “The 
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.”50 This means not only that the law gives directors day-
to-day control, but that it specifically denies control to 
shareholders.51 Directors’ control of corporate governance is not 
a usurpation of shareholders’ legal rights. Rather, it is the explicit 
design of corporate law, in which collective ownership creates 
governance problems. Some corporations, like Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., are owned by small, harmonious groups of 
shareholders who run the corporation because they also serve as 
the directors and officers. Most large corporations, however, have 
huge numbers of shareholders who cannot operate by consensus 
and do not (and may not want to) serve as directors or officers. 
Centralized control by professional managers thus arose as “a 
highly efficient solution to the decisionmaking problems faced by 
larger corporations.”52 Efficiency and democracy, however, are 
two very different principles. 
Unfortunately, it is not surprising that the Court gets 
corporate law so wrong. The Court has little interest in business 
law per se.53 In the constitutional context, it makes inaccurate, 
 
 48. 558 U.S. at 477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 49.  See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“A cardinal precept 
of the [Delaware Code] is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business 
and affairs of the corporation.”) 
 50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a); cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b). 
 51. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The 
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 573–74 (2002) 
(“Shareholders exercise virtually no control over either day-to-day operations or long-
term policy”). In practice, boards delegate much of their management power to executive 
officers they appoint, such as the CEO. 
 52. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence 
Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. 45, 59 (2002). 
 53.  See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private 
Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1573 
(2004) (arguing that the Court suffered from a “loss of interest” in securities regulation 
and antitrust law following the 1987 retirement of Justice Lewis Powell, a former corporate 
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unsupported generalizations about corporate law that seem more 
normative than descriptive.54 Since most of the non-corporate 
legal community (like the Court) has only limited interest in and 
understanding of corporate law, the superficiality of its corporate-
governance analysis tends to go unnoticed. Indeed, even though 
his Citizens United dissent criticized the Court’s flawed 
assumptions about corporate governance, Justice Stevens seemed 
to be similarly uninterested in the details of corporate law. He did 
not refute the “corporate democracy” assertion in detail, and 
devoted only two of the eighty-six pages of his dissent to the issue. 
In Bellotti, the Court cited three specific examples of 
“procedures of corporate democracy”: “the judicial remedy of a 
derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to 
have been made for improper corporate purposes,” shareholders’ 
ability “to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation’s 
charter,” and shareholders’ “power to elect the board of 
directors.”55 The Court did not describe these mechanisms in any 
detail. In Citizens United, the Court simply repeated Bellotti’s 
general assertion about “procedures of corporate democracy” 
(and even asserted that they had been enhanced by advances in 
information technology56) without elaboration. In fact, the three 
governance devices cited in Bellotti are far more limited than the 
Court casually assumed. In general, corporate governance is not 
intended to be a democracy, but rather a management-centered 
technocracy.57 The remainder of this Part shows that these three 
devices are not examples of democratic governance. This Part 
goes into considerable doctrinal detail to correct the gross, 
inaccurate generalizations that have distorted the First 
Amendment analysis of corporate campaign finance law. 
 
lawyer); cf. A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 845 (2003) (explaining that Justice “Powell felt 
a special responsibility to guide his colleagues when they faced securities law questions” 
due to their relative lack of experience with securities law). 
 54. Cf. Gregory A. Mark, The Court and the Corporation: Jurisprudence, Localism, 
and Federalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1997). Despite lip service to the notion that 
corporate law was reserved to the states, Mark argues that the Court had, by the early 
nineteenth century, “casually adopted a single, universal understanding of what 
constituted a corporation, rather than allowing the states to define the entity.” Id. at 422. 
Indeed, Mark argues that it was the Court, and not the states, that “define[d] the role of 
the corporation in the political economy and the role of managers within the corporation.” 
Id. at 435 (summarizing the case law). 
 55. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978). 
 56. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (citing Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794). 
 57. See, e.g., Joo, supra note 3, at 39–79; see also Thomas W. Joo, A Trip through the 
Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 744–63 (2003). 
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B. LIMITS ON SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION:  
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
The “business judgment rule” (“BJR”), a judicially created 
state law doctrine, reflects how corporate governance 
concentrates authority in the board of directors. Bellotti asserted 
that shareholders may use litigation to “challenge corporate 
disbursements alleged to have been made for improper corporate 
purposes or merely to further the personal interests of 
management,” but ignored the BJR’s limits on this ability. Justice 
Stevens referred to the BJR only in passing in his Citizens United 
dissent, but it is of central importance in circumscribing the role 
of shareholders and enlarging the discretion of directors. The BJR 
insulates directors from shareholder lawsuits challenging the 
substance of their decisions, and political spending decisions 
appear to be included. 
Corporate directors have few enumerated legal duties. While 
it is often asserted that directors have a “duty” to enrich 
shareholders or to act in their best interests, this is simply not true. 
In fact, it is legally irrelevant whether a decision of the board 
actually benefited shareholders.58 The relevant inquiry pertains to 
the process and motivation behind the decision, not its result. This 
inquiry is a highly deferential one: the BJR operates on the 
“presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of 
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests of the 
company . . . . Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will 
be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging 
the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.”59 
Case law demonstrates that rebutting the presumption is 
extremely difficult, and that the category of “business decision” 
to which it applies is very broadly defined. For example, in Kahn 
v. Sullivan, the Delaware Supreme Court applied the BJR when 
shareholders challenged a corporation’s charitable contribution.60 
The Occidental Petroleum Corporation’s board had approved an 
$85 million corporate donation to establish the Armand Hammer 
Museum and Cultural Center, which had been proposed by and 
 
 58. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 181 (1968) (“[W]e do not mean 
to say that we have decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one. That is 
beyond our jurisdiction and ability. We are merely saying that the decision is one properly 
before directors and the motives alleged in the amended complaint showed no fraud, 
illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision”). 
 59. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 60. 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991). 
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named after Occidental’s chairman and CEO in order to display 
his personal art collection. Although the decision obviously 
benefited Hammer, and the other directors had obvious reasons 
to cater to him, the court deferred to the board’s decision because 
the shareholders had failed to overcome the BJR’s presumptions. 
The court noted that the directors responsible had no personal 
financial interest in the outcome and were not “dominated” by 
Hammer.61 In keeping with the BJR’s focus on procedure and not 
substance, the court made no inquiry into whether the 
contribution actually generated any benefit to the corporation or 
its shareholders. Note that the court applied the business 
judgment rule to this decision of the board even though it had no 
readily apparent connection to the corporation’s petroleum 
business. 
A California case, Marsili v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,62 
applied the BJR to corporate political expenditures in similar 
fashion. A municipal ballot measure in San Francisco proposed a 
voter approval requirement on the construction of tall buildings. 
Shareholders challenged a utility company’s contributions to a 
group opposing the measure, which had no obvious connection to 
the company’s business. The court stated that the board was not 
required to show that the expenditures would benefit the 
corporation.63 Indeed, the court held that it was required to defer 
to the board’s decision unless it found, “as a matter of law, that the 
contribution could not be construed as incidental or expedient for 
the attainment of corporate purposes.”64 
Under the BJR, shareholders would have great difficulty 
suing directors for expending corporate funds for political 
purposes. Merely disagreeing with the expenditure on political 
grounds would state no claim. The BJR would impose an 
extremely strong presumption that the expenditure was proper. 
Arguing that the expenditure had no clear benefit to the 
corporation or showing that it served the directors’ personal 
interests would not upset that presumption. Shareholders would 
face a very high burden of proving the directors’ bad faith or 
complete failure to inform themselves. 
 
 61. Id. at 59–60. 
 62. 51 Cal. App. 3d 313 (1975). 
 63. Id. at 324–35. 
 64. Id. at 324. 
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C. LIMITS ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING POWER 
1. Policy and Charter Amendments 
The Bellotti Court also inaccurately stated that shareholders 
control corporate actions through voting and the corporate 
charter. Similarly, Justice Scalia has asserted that management 
must act “in accord with what the majority (or a specified 
supermajority) of the shareholders wishes, so long as that action 
is designed to make a profit. That is the deal.”65 But shareholder 
approval of management decisions is not the deal. As noted 
above, the corporation “shall” be managed by its board of 
directors. Thus the vast majority of the board’s actions are not 
subject to a shareholder vote. (Furthermore, as explained in the 
foregoing discussion, the BJR requires no proof that a board 
decision was “designed to make a profit.”) 
State corporation codes give shareholders explicit approval 
power over only a tiny subset of management actions classified 
(somewhat arbitrarily) as “fundamental changes.”66 These are 
typically limited to amendments to the corporate charter, a 
merger with another corporation, the dissolution of the 
corporation, and the sale of all (or substantially all) of the 
corporation’s assets.67 A corporation undergoes these 
“fundamental” changes infrequently, if ever. Among these 
changes, only charter amendments are potentially relevant to 
political spending. According to the Bellotti Court, shareholders 
can “insist upon protective provisions in the corporation’s 
charter.” But while a charter amendment could conceivably limit 
the board’s power over a corporation’s political spending, 
shareholders in most states may only approve (or disapprove) 
amendments proposed by the board of directors; they may not 
initiate charter amendments on their own.68 The assertions of 
Bellotti notwithstanding, shareholders in most corporations can 
only request that directors initiate a charter amendment; they 
have no legal power to “insist” on one. 
 
 65. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 686 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Austin upheld a corporate campaign finance regulation using reasoning 
inconsistent with Bellotti; Justice Scalia made this argument in dissent. Twenty years later, 
Citizens United expressly overruled Austin and reaffirmed Bellotti. 
 66. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 3.1.3(a), at 195 (2d ed. 2010). 
 67. See id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 242(b) (charter amendment), 251(c) 
(merger), 271 (sale of assets), 275(b) (dissolution). 
 68. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.1.3(a), at 196; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
242(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(a). 
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In large corporations, elections take place at an annual 
shareholder meeting, but the vast majority of shareholders, who 
are spread out around the country or even the world, do not 
attend. Thus the corporation (and occasionally, some other party) 
solicits shareholders’ proxies: that is, it asks them for permission 
to cast their votes in a certain way. The board, at the corporation’s 
expense, produces and distributes to shareholders a set of “proxy 
materials” that include a description of the issues to be voted on, 
as well as the corporation’s proxy solicitation. Federal securities 
law regulates the proxy process. A shareholder may make a 
proposal for shareholders to vote on, but the law expressly 
permits the corporation (that is, its board of directors) to exclude 
certain shareholder proposals from the corporation’s proxy 
materials.69 If the corporation properly excludes a proposal from 
the corporation’s proxy materials, the proponent must pay for the 
separate production and dissemination of her own proxy 
materials. This can be difficult and costly, as the materials must 
conform to federal securities regulations. Lacking the official 
imprimatur of the corporation, independent proxy materials risk 
being perceived as junk mail by shareholders who receive them. 
Federal law provides a number of grounds on which a 
corporation may exclude a shareholder proposal from the proxy 
materials. For example, a proposal that is not “a proper subject 
for action by shareholders” may be excluded.70 According to the 
SEC, some shareholder proposals, “depending on the subject 
matter,” would violate state law if they were binding on the 
corporation.71 This is apparently a reference to the rule that 
directors and not shareholders manage the corporation.72 To 
avoid exclusion on this ground, shareholder proposals are 
typically worded in nonbinding form.73 
2. Director Elections 
Shareholders have the power to vote for directors, but this 
power is of limited consequence in the vast majority of elections. 
 
 69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., 8 Del. Code § 141(a), discussed supra. In fact, the extent to which state 
law prohibits binding shareholder proposals is less than clear. See also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 511–14 (4th ed. 2006). But the SEC’s guidance is 
influential, since it will decide in the first instance whether a corporation may exclude a 
particular proposal, and its decision will be subject to the standard judicial deference 
accorded to agency determinations. See id. at 513–14. 
 73. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.2.3(a) at 270. 
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In fact, “shareholders in public corporations do not in any realistic 
sense elect boards. Rather, boards elect themselves.”74 Director 
elections are rarely contested; incumbent directors or their 
nominees typically run unopposed.75 Voting for directors thus 
gives shareholders no significant influence on boards’ political 
spending. 
Because default state law rules allow directors to be elected 
by a plurality of votes cast, unopposed directors can be elected 
even if they receive more negative than positive votes.76 Many 
companies have voluntarily instituted rules under which directors 
must submit their resignations if they do not receive a majority of 
positive votes in an uncontested election. (These policies are 
sometimes referred to as “plurality plus” or “Pfizer-style” 
policies.)77 But even in such situations, the board may reject the 
resignations and allow the directors to continue to serve.78 
Federal securities law deliberately impedes corporate 
democracy in a fundamental way: proxy regulations actively 
discourage shareholders from contesting the election of 
directors.79 Indeed, even when an election is contested, the 
corporation is not required to list the challengers’ names in the 
corporation’s proxy materials. The challengers must fund their 
own separate proxy solicitation. 80 Although state law does not 
prohibit shareholders from nominating directors, federal 
securities law expressly permits the corporation to exclude a 
shareholder’s proposal to nominate a specific director candidate.81 
In fact, federal law also permits the exclusion of any shareholder 
 
 74. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 311 (1999). 
 75. See GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.1.2(a), at 187. 
 76. See The Election of Corporate Directors: What Happens When Shareowners 
Withhold a Majority of Votes from Director Nominees? GMI RATINGS (Aug. 2012) at 6, 
http://www3.gmiratings.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/GMIRatings_IRRC_082012.
pdf. 
 77.  See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d 
281, 284 n.4 (Del. 2009) (en banc). Pfizer, Inc. was one of the first major corporations to 
adopt such a rule. Id. 
 78. See GMI RATINGS, supra note 76. This occurred in City of Westland, discussed 
infra note 86. 
 79. In fact, prior to a rule change in 2010, the SEC specifically stated on numerous 
occasions that proposals to reform director election procedures could be excluded on the 
ground that they “would establish a procedure that may result in contested elections of 
directors.” See Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: 
Shareholder Voice and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735, 762, & nn. 
125–26. Although the current rule (described in the text) has been narrowed somewhat, 
the rule still significantly limits the contestation of elections. 
 80. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra 72, at 408. 
 81. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(iv). 
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proposal that “otherwise could affect the outcome of the 
upcoming election of directors,” such as an objection to one of the 
board’s nominees or an immediate change to election 
procedures.82 Corporate law thus facilitates the board’s control of 
elections, allowing it nearly exclusive use of corporate resources 
in corporate election campaigns. 
3. Informed Voting: Law vs. Technology 
In Citizens United, the Court opined that “corporate 
democracy” has become more effective since Bellotti because 
technology has made shareholders more informed.83 This shows 
remarkable naïveté about the interaction between technology and 
law. While public-domain information is more easily accessible in 
the internet era, much corporate information is proprietary and 
protected from shareholder inquiries. Shareholders have no 
general right to inform themselves about management conduct 
through corporate records. The corporation must grant a 
shareholder’s request to view corporate records only if the 
shareholder can demonstrate that the request has a “proper 
purpose.”84 Although this requirement sounds innocuous, “it can 
produce fairly extensive court proceedings.”85 Under Delaware 
case law, for example, seeking evidence of wrongdoing or 
mismanagement is a “proper purpose.” However, a shareholder 
may not inspect corporate records for that purpose unless she first 
presents independently obtained evidence forming a “credible 
basis” for suspicion.86 Shareholders thus have very limited ability 
to monitor corporate political activity using the corporation’s own 
information. 
 
 82. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(8)(v). This includes, but is not limited to, proposals that 
would disqualify a nominee, remove a sitting director, or question “the competence, 
business judgment, or character” of a nominee or director. See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-
8(i)(8)(i)–(iii). In 2010, the SEC adopted a so-called “proxy access” rule that would have 
required the corporation to include a director nomination made by a large shareholder or 
bloc (representing at least three percent of a corporation’s voting power) under certain 
circumstances. But the D.C. Circuit struck down the rule in 2011, finding that the SEC had 
been “arbitrary and capricious” in adopting it. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 
1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 83. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010).. 
 84. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2010); City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. 
Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d 281, 287 (Del. 2010). Cf. MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 16.02(d)(1). 
 85. GEVURTZ, supra note 66, § 3.1.3(c), at 217. 
 86. See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d 
281, 287 (Del. 2009) (en banc). 
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A 2010 Delaware Supreme Court opinion demonstrates the 
strictness of the rule. The court rejected a shareholder request to 
view records regarding two major governance issues: a potential 
sale of the company and a board election. In 2008, the board of 
Axcelis Technologies, Inc. rejected another company’s offers to 
buy out Axcelis’s shareholders at $5.20 and later $6 per share.87 
(These were generous offers: the market price of the shares was 
$4.18 at the time of the first offer.88) A few months later, three 
directors ran for re-election unopposed, but failed to receive a 
majority vote. Because Axcelis had a “Pfizer-style” policy, they 
tendered their resignations. The board, however, refused to 
accept the resignations. About a year later, after further 
acquisition negotiations failed, Axcelis defaulted on a debt 
obligation and its stock price fell to 41 cents.89 
The City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System (an 
Axcelis shareholder) asked to see Axcelis’s records regarding the 
board’s refusal to accept the director resignations and its rejection 
of the acquisition offers. The court rejected both requests on the 
ground that the plaintiffs had not presented any evidence of 
wrongdoing by the board. The requested records themselves were 
of course the most likely source of such evidence. In short, 
shareholders have no general right to inform themselves via 
corporate records, which further limits their already limited 
voting power. 
D. “SHAREHOLDER VOTING” IS INHERENTLY UNDEMOCRATIC 
Of course, an individual’s voting power is also limited in our 
political system. But that merely suggests the shortcomings of our 
nominally democratic politics; it does not attest to the democratic 
character of corporate governance. Indeed, corporate voting 
power is based on economic and not democratic principles: it is 
not equal among individuals, but weighted on the basis of 
financial interest. 
The term “shareholder voting” is somewhat misleading, as 
votes are allocated not per shareholder but per share90—that is, on 
 
 87. Id. at 283. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 285. 
 90. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.21(a). This 
has not always been the case. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the 
Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1347, 1354–55 (2006) (explaining that each shareholder had one vote in many 
nineteenth-century corporations). 
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the basis of wealth. The rare shareholders that can successfully 
influence corporate management are individuals and institutions 
that control huge numbers of votes—i.e., those wealthy enough to 
own huge numbers of shares. Furthermore, not all shares receive 
an equal vote, or any vote at all. While a corporation must have a 
class of voting stock, not every class must have voting rights, and 
not every voting class must have equal voting rights.91 Some 
corporations have classes of shares with super-voting power that 
are expressly designed to concentrate voting power in a 
controlling shareholder or group. Facebook, for example, 
allocates about four percent of its total shareholder votes to its 
publicly held shares and the remainder to a separate class of stock 
that is not for sale to the public.92 This capital structure gives the 
majority of Facebook’s shareholder voting power to its CEO, 
Mark Zuckerberg.93 
Moreover, voting power is allocated only to shareholders, as 
are the other (limited) governance rights discussed in this Essay: 
fiduciary duty suits, the approval of charter amendments, and 
access to corporate records. The Court has insisted over and over 
that corporate constitutional “rights” actually protect the rights of 
the individuals behind the corporation. It has, however, been 
vague as to just who those individuals are. In Pembina, for 
instance, the Court stated only that corporations are “associations 
of individuals united for a special purpose.” In an 1883 circuit 
court opinion that strongly influenced the Court’s aggregate 
theory,94 Justice Field argued that Fourteenth Amendment 
protection of corporate property protects “the corporators also.”95 
It is unclear to whom Field was referring. The archaic term 
 
 91. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 212(a); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.21(a) (stating 
that the default allocation of one vote per share may be altered by the corporation’s 
charter). 
 92. At the time of its initial public offering of Class A common stock in 2012, 
Facebook explained that stock would receive one vote per share, while its Class B stock, 
which is not sold to the public, would receive ten. It further explained: “The holders of our 
outstanding shares of Class B common stock will hold approximately 95.9% of the voting 
power of our outstanding capital stock following this offering, and our founder, Chairman, 
and CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, will hold or have the ability to control approximately 55.8% 
of the voting power of our outstanding capital stock following this offering.” Facebook, 
Inc., Amendment No. 8, to Registration Statement Under Securities Act of 1933, (Form 
S-1) (May 16, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/00011
9312512235588/d287954ds1a.htm. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See Charles R. O’Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited, 67 
GEO. L. J. 1347, 1353–56 (1979). 
 95. Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 404 (C.C.D. 1883). Justice Field 
wrote this opinion for the Circuit in his capacity as Circuit Justice. 
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“corporator” was sometimes used to refer to the managers who 
exercise the corporate powers, as distinct from the shareholders, 
who do not.96 Today, shareholders are often assumed to be the 
primary corporate constituents, as indicated by the discussion 
(however brief and dismissive) of shareholder interests in Bellotti 
and Citizens. The Hobby Lobby Court, however, stated that 
corporate constitutional protection protects a broader set of 
people, “including shareholders, officers and employees.”97 
In fact, corporate constitutional claims are even less 
representative of employee interests than shareholder interests. 
Employees and other non-shareholder corporate constituents 
(such as creditors) have no voting power and are owed no 
fiduciary duties. But corporate policies, such as wages and 
benefits, layoffs, and taking on additional debt often have a more 
immediate and dramatic effect on them than on shareholders.98 
Executives and large creditors can use economic leverage to 
protect their interests (and executives control policymaking in any 
event). Rank-and-file employees and smaller creditors and 
clients, however, lack economic leverage (with the exception of 
some unionized employees). Shareholder advocates have had 
some success advancing reforms (such as the Pfizer rule) intended 
to increase management responsiveness to shareholders. This is 
an admirable goal, but it does nothing for corporations’ other 
constituents, whose economic and political interests differ from 
those of shareholders. Such reforms may increase shareholders’ 
control over their investments, but they should not be mistaken 
for “democratic” reform. 
The Supreme Court either fails to understand corporate 
governance or deliberately misrepresents it, misleadingly 
describing it as “democratic.” The Court invokes “corporate 
democracy” as part of its “listeners’ rights” argument, which is 
based on the unrestricted flow of information, even though 
corporate law expressly limits shareholder access to information. 
The Court insists that “corporate democracy” justifies the role of 
corporations in financing our political elections, despite the anti-
 
 96. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the 
Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646 (1982). 
 97. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014). The Court nonetheless ignored the dissent’s 
argument that legal exemptions for corporations based on the religious views of their 
owners might burden the religious exercise of their employees. See id. at 2795–96 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 98. See Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the “D-Word,” 63 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1579, 1587–88 (2006). 
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competitive and wealth-based aspects of conducting and financing 
corporate elections. 
Corporate law assigns voting power according to the size and 
nature of one’s economic interest in the corporation. Such an 
allocation may be justifiable on economic grounds. Indeed, it is 
generally beneficial to shareholders in their capacity as financial 
investors, and most shareholders seem to be satisfied with it. But 
it does not constitute corporate “democracy,” and cannot justify 
the role of corporations in our electoral system. A democratic 
allocation of voting power is not dependent on economic 
interests. Suffrage may not be conditioned on wealth, property 
ownership or the ability to pay a fee,99 nor on one’s economic 
role.100 In a democracy, each voter’s vote is counted once, and only 
once.101 Shareholders and other corporate constituents might 
arguably be seen as having agreed to the wealth-based allocation 
of voting power as a condition of their investment or other 
relationship to the corporation. But even if voluntary and 
bargained for, vote selling is, like wealth-based qualifications, 
inconsistent with a democratic process, and is prohibited in the 
political context.102 The more the law allows corporate 
participation in the electoral process, the more corporate 
governance becomes an element of political governance. While 
the non-democratic nature of corporate governance may serve 
valid economic goals, it justifies limiting the role of business 
corporations in our politics. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A constitutional amendment denying constitutional 
“personhood” to corporations would not have a determinative 
effect on corporate campaign finance doctrine. But it could help 
communicate public attitudes and thus have some effect on the 
 
 99. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (outlawing poll taxes); Harper v. Va. Bd. of 
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (holding that “a state violates the Equal Protection 
Clause . . . of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or 
payment of any fee an electoral standard”). 
 100. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (holding that “there is no indication 
in the Constitution that homesite or occupation affords a permissible basis for 
distinguishing between qualified voters within the State”). 
 101. See id. at 380–81 (“The only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution 
concerns matters of representation, such as the allocation of Senators . . . irrespective of 
population and the use of the electoral college in the choice of a President . . . [O]nce the 
class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, we see no constitutional way by 
which equality of voting power may be evaded.”). 
 102. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1996) (prohibiting paying any person “to vote or 
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate”). 
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Court’s future decisions. The “Democracy for All Amendment” 
is more directly responsive to the current jurisprudence, in that it 
expressly permits distinctions between individual and corporate 
campaign finance regulation. As this Essay has argued, however, 
simply correcting the Court’s assumptions about corporate 
governance law could reform the case law without a constitutional 
amendment. Because “corporate democracy” does not protect 
shareholders (and other corporate constituents) from 
management’s misuse of corporate resources for political 
purposes, the Court could recognize a compelling governmental 
interest in providing such protection. 
This would require neither a constitutional amendment, nor 
even any fundamental changes to First Amendment doctrine. It 
could be accomplished through the relatively modest step of 
reversing (explicitly or implicitly) Bellotti and that part of Citizens 
United that echoed Bellotti. Indeed, the Court has arguably 
provided an opening for the arguments presented here. When it 
cited Bellotti in Citizens, the Court stated, “There is . . . little 
evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders 
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy.’” The analysis 
here suggests that shareholders might lead the way in challenging 
the legal regime permitting corporate political spending by 
pointing out how corporate governance in fact gives them no 
mechanism to “correct” abuses. Hobby Lobby can also be viewed 
as consistent with an appreciation of shareholders’ limited control 
of large corporations. The Court held that corporate policy 
implicated the religious exercise of individuals, but limited its 
holding to closely held corporations. Unlike large, publicly traded 
corporations, the plaintiff corporations were owned and run by 
families with unanimous religious views and not by professional 
managers independent of the shareholders. 
Doctrine always changes, sometimes rapidly, as Court 
personnel or political and economic conditions change. Corporate 
constitutional rights have been no exception. The Court initially 
refused to extend the Fourteenth Amendment to economic and 
corporate rights in the Reconstruction era. In the next decades, 
however, it completely reversed itself, ushering in the Lochner 
era. Lochnerism eventually gave way during the New Deal. Yet 
the contemporary First Amendment protection of corporate and 
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commercial messages has been called the revival of Lochnerism.103 
The pendulum will eventually swing again. Whether courts 
reverse doctrine or apply existing doctrine to reach different 
results, public attitudes and political pressure can surely make a 
difference. The recent dramatic changes in same-sex marriage law 
attest to this. 
In fact, although current campaign finance jurisprudence is 
strongly pro-corporate, that is a recent development. By relying 
on listeners’ rights, Bellotti seemed to prohibit treating corporate 
political contributions differently from those of individuals. But 
the Court seemed to reverse itself in Austin twelve years later, 
citing the “unfair advantage” enjoyed by corporations. After 
another twenty years, Citizens United overruled Austin and 
reaffirmed Bellotti. Such dramatic reversals could occur again. 
The tension between skepticism of speech regulation and 
revulsion at the influence of money is likely a constant that fuels 
an ongoing cycle of doctrinal revision. 
 
 
 103. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm. of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 589 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, First 
Amendment Imperialism, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 659, 661 (1999). 
